Valery Solovey: by 2024 there will be 15-20 regions in Russia and state ideology

Political scientist, MGIMO professor Valery Solovey expressed his opinion regarding rumors about imminent constitutional reform in Russia.

The other day, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, spoke about the need to change the Constitution of the country.

According to Professor Solovy, by 2024 in Russia the number of federal subjects will be reduced through unification and state ideology will be introduced.

Valery Solovey:

I have already written and spoken on this topic, and I would be happy to repeat it.

1. Preparation of constitutional reform, or rather fundamental changes in wide range constitutional laws was launched in the fall of 2017.

2. Changes were developed in the following areas:

a) the formation of a new configuration of state power and governance;

b) a radical reduction in the number of subjects of the federation (to 15-20) by merging them for the purpose of ease of administration, equalizing levels of development and neutralizing ethnic separatist tendencies;

c) decisive amendments to the laws on elections and political parties (not at all in the sense of liberalization);

d) introduction of state ideology.
Well, and one more thing.

3. Initially, it was not clear which of the changes and in what volume would be given the green light, and which would not.

But in any case, they were not supposed to be implemented all at the same time due to the predicted strong negative reaction.

4. Sine qua non - reconfiguration of state power and management, which should provide an institutional and legal framework for the transit of the system.

There are also several options here.

From the well-known model with the establishment of the State Council as an analogue of the Politburo and the reduction of the role of the president to representative and symbolic functions to, on the contrary, the strengthening and expansion of presidential powers and the establishment of the post of vice president. (There are several other options.)

5. The transit of the system should be completed before 2024 in order to take external and internal enemies by surprise. It was assumed that 2020-2021 could be decisive.

6. There is only one reason why these deadlines could be shifted downwards.

And this reason has nothing to do with politics and declining ratings. The situation is assessed as concerning, but not critical and under control.

7. And, moreover, there was no talk of any early elections and there could not be any talk. A fundamental change in the organization of state power and management is not being carried out in order to hold elections and subject the system to extreme stress.

8. Among the key beneficiaries of the reform, the authorities name three people who are already among the top ten elite in terms of their political and bureaucratic weight.

Russian political scientist - about Ulyukaev’s hope, Kadyrov’s pacification and Putin’s pause

In just six months, the main memes on the Russian political agenda have become “a request for change” and “an image of the future,” previously well known only to readers of the newspaper Zavtra. The famous historian, political scientist and publicist Valery Solovey spoke in an interview with Realnoe Vremya about what fills these memes with content, namely about the growing political activity of citizens, the confusion of the elites and the still hidden function of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Appeals from the regions were left to chance: react as you wish

Valery Dmitrievich, you recently wrote on your Twitter that the situation in the country is being rocked not by a conspiracy, but by “stupidity and methodologists.” Apparently, they meant the “Schedrovites” and their main public representative Sergei Kiriyenko? What exactly were the mistakes made by the presidential administration under him?

Yes, they meant advisers close to Kiriyenko from the group of “methodologists”. According to general opinion (by universal I mean the opinion of Moscow political experts and people close to the administration of the President of the Russian Federation), they failed to determine the correct political line of behavior and made a number of mistakes. Related, for example, to the reaction to the events of March 26 and June 12 and, in general, the reaction to the Navalny phenomenon. Do you remember, say, a video in which Navalny is compared to Hitler, or a song by Alisa Vox, which calls on schoolchildren not to go to rallies, but to “start with yourself.” It is clear that the legs are in this case grew out of the administration. And all this worked to the benefit of Alexey Anatolyevich. I’m not even talking about more serious things, when requests from the regions asking for advice on how to react to Navalny’s upcoming actions were actually left to chance: react as you want. This is despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Russian regions (Tatarstan in this case is an exception) need an understanding of the Kremlin’s position and clear instructions.

This is one part of the problem. The second is that people who are tightly integrated into the presidential administration are increasingly estimating its ability to solve the problems that face the country and specifically the Kremlin. Moreover, there is some contradiction here, because they personally rate Sergei Kiriyenko quite highly. But at the same time they note that, at least until the summer of this year, he was not able to establish efficient work administration. Perhaps this was due to internal opposition. Not everything was fine there; he had conflicts with other prominent apparatchiks. Either it took him a long time to get used to it, or the fact is that when he agreed to go into administration, there was one situation in the country, and now, starting in the early spring of this year, there has been a political revival. That is, a different situation arose, and it was still necessary to comprehend it, understand what was happening, and suggest how to cope with it.

“It was an ‘offer you can’t refuse,’ but Kiriyenko was probably promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, ran a successful presidential campaign.” Photo kremlin.ru

- So, Kiriyenko was invited to this position? Didn't he really want her?

This was “an offer that could not be refused,” but Kiriyenko was likely promised a reward if he did his job effectively, that is, successfully ran the presidential campaign. I don’t know what type of reward, but you can guess that we are talking about a post in the government. Maybe about the position of head of the cabinet. After all, for the head of Rosatom, moving to the position of deputy chief of the presidential administration is a loss of status, independence and a significant complication of life.

The elite is experiencing an accumulation of tension, discontent and fear

The trial of former Russian Minister of Economic Development Alexei Ulyukaev has begun, in which the defendant has already accused the head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, of provoking a bribe. What other interesting things do you think we can hear during this trial?

In fact, we haven't heard anything interesting yet. For political Moscow, what Ulyukaev outlined is no secret - this scenario was discussed long before the trial. More precisely, not a script, but the background of events.

And I think that nothing else awaits us. Ulyukaev, of course, will not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him this is fraught with a worsening of the situation. I think he still hopes that his offense will be reclassified to a less serious one, and he will receive a suspended sentence. Or he will be released due to the upcoming amnesty on the occasion of the centenary of the October Revolution. But the fact that there will be no acquittal is absolutely certain.

- It will be a great irony of fate if it is released on the occasion of the centenary of October.

Well, in Russia everything is already permeated not even with irony, but with the grotesque. Look at the story with Poklonskaya - it’s something Kafkaesque. Or, rather, Gogol, Saltykovo-Shchedrin.

“I think that nothing else awaits us. Ulyukaev, of course, will not reveal any Kremlin secrets, because for him this is fraught with a worsening of the situation.” Photo iz.ru

How would you comment on Alexey Venediktov’s assumption that Sergei Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev’s statement?

Yes, anyone can stand. In general, Alexey Alekseevich has a sound idea. Chemezov and Sechin are opponents. And if they are opponents, then Chemezov, as an influential person, can somehow support Ulyukaev so that life does not seem like honey to Igor Ivanovich. But even if Chemezov is behind Ulyukaev’s statement, this does not mean that the verdict will be acquittal. The prosecution will get its way, there is no doubt about it. Ulyukaev will definitely not be able to leave the courtroom with a clean, unblemished reputation. It is quite possible to write over the Russian court, as over Dante’s Inferno: “Abandon hope, all who enter here.” This is just such a hopeless place.

All the fuss will be about what exactly Ulyukaev will receive - imprisonment, probation or amnesty.

That is, this court does not tell us about some tectonic shifts, about a “split of the elites,” as Dmitry Gudkov suggested?

There is no schism. A split in the elite is when different groups of the elite have different views on how to build a strategy for the development of the country and society, and not when they are fighting for resources. A split in the Russian elite will arise in one and only case - when very powerful pressure is exerted on the central government from below in the form of popular uprisings. Then the elite will have doubts about its political future and different options for this future will appear.

- Can foreign political pressure split it?

No, he can not. It can - and is already causing - growing tension. But this does not mean that any of them, much less any group, will dare to openly oppose Putin if he decides to go to the polls. This is absolutely impossible.

So far, quantitative rather than qualitative changes are taking place in the Russian elite. There is an accumulation of tension, discontent and fear. The latter is caused by the clause in the American sanctions law, which involves an investigation into the connections of parastatal structures of oligarchs with the Kremlin. Moreover, not only the oligarchs themselves, but also members of their families are subject to the law. This is what they are very afraid of. But these are moods, emotions. There is no action.

“It serves two functions. The first is to maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is the personal guarantor of stability in this region. And secondly, to act as a support for the regime in the event of mass unrest.” Photo kremlin.ru

“We will face many local protests, which will gradually merge into a national one”

- What role does Ramzan Kadyrov play in the Russian elite, who is already there were a lot, and recently there have been even more?

It performs two functions. First, maintain stability in Chechnya and maintain stability in the North Caucasus. He is the personal guarantor of stability in this region. And secondly, to act as a support for the regime in the event of mass unrest.

- Unrest in Moscow, you mean?

If unrest begins, it will most likely become national. That is, they can cover several cities.

When, say, he talks about his key role in the “Crimean Spring” (as claimed on social networks), is this agreed with the Kremlin?

Hardly. He considers himself a strong independent figure. Kadyrov is by far the most powerful regional leader Russian Federation, significantly more influential than everyone else. Accordingly, he allows himself what no one, including major federal figures, can afford.

What is the reason for the statement of the head of VTsIOM Valery Fedorov that the demand for stability in Russian society has been replaced by a request for change? Especially in light of the fact that Fedorov considers this phase dangerous, I quote: “Revolutionary sentiments appear not in a situation of crisis, but when the crisis is over.”

The very request for change after a twenty-year, if not more, request for stability is a very serious, almost tectonic shift. But we will not find out what consequences it will lead to immediately, but within two to three years. Because changes in people's consciousness are not enough - it is much more important that their political behavior changes. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the Navalny phenomenon. This is what Gleb Pavlovsky called politicization.

“Changes in people's minds are not enough - it is much more important that their political behavior changes. We have signs of such political novelty - this is the participation of people in unauthorized actions, and the Navalny phenomenon.” Photo by Oleg Tikhonov

You just need to be aware that mass dynamics are absolutely and fundamentally unpredictable. We don't know how political activity will develop. I am inclined to believe that it will increase, that is, we will be faced with many local protests that will gradually begin to merge into a national one. And I do not rule out that this will begin next fall.

And the political crisis itself, if we enter into it, and it looks like we are slowly being drawn into it, will last at least two years, most likely even three years. But all this is still a big question mark. Because a change in the mood of citizens does not automatically result in a change in behavior.

Perhaps the very appearance of such a statement from the head of a pro-government sociological structure indicates that the authorities themselves are trying to ride this wave?

No, the authorities are trying to protect themselves from it. She just understands that this is a threat. How to ride?

- Lead the renewal process yourself.

This could be done if one stood for election new person with a fundamentally new national agenda. Which would offer an image of the future. Or if Putin had suggested it. That is, if you and I saw the new Putin. In practice this is impossible, but theoretically it cannot be ruled out.

So you think that Putin will still go to the polls, but will be armed with some vague agenda?

You know, we will know for sure whether he will go or not until October. There are still doubts about this, albeit microscopic. Although everything he does is very reminiscent of an election campaign. However, until he personally announces that he is running in the elections, doubts will remain.

“You know, we will know for sure whether he will go or not until October. There are still doubts about this, albeit microscopic. Although everything he does is very reminiscent of an election campaign.” Photo kremlin.ru

In the meantime, he says: “I think. I have not decided yet". Maybe he has decided, but he’s hiding it. Or maybe he really didn’t decide. I can only say that this pause is causing some confusion among the political elite. She would prefer certainty, and the sooner the better.

- Then why do you think that he will announce this no earlier than October?

I don’t think so, as far as we know, those in the inner circle think so. But, again, these are all rumors. He didn’t announce this during the “direct line”. They say that in October it will become clear that Putin has promised to introduce it. Or maybe he will introduce it in November.

The ending follows

Rustem Shakirov

Professor Solovey regularly mentions some future decision by the Kremlin, which will inevitably lead to change.

The activity of a statesman and politician is always judged based on its outcome. If the finale turns out to be successful, then all his previous activities are painted in positive tones. If his ending was not successful, not successful, then all his previous activities are also subject to negative coverage. For President Putin, the finale is still ahead, although his era is certainly ending.

“I believe that in general his activities will be assessed negatively,” says Valery Solovey, political scientist, historian, professor at MGIMO.

In the history of Russia, no leader has been in more favorable conditions than Vladimir Putin. Russia had no external enemies; the attitude of the West, despite all the conflicts, was generally favorable. There were high oil prices, which had a beneficial effect on the country's budget. Society welcomed Putin; after the Yeltsin era, it seemed that this was the beginning of the country's revival. And for the first seven to ten years, Putin really justified the trust of society, the country’s economy grew and the income of the population grew.

And then everything began to change when Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev conceived and carried out a castling exchange of posts.

“And people were offended, they considered it a deception. In fact, it was a deception,” says Valery Solovey.

People, no matter what country they live in, always experience psychological fatigue from the ruler, and this fatigue occurs if the ruler rules for a long time, more than ten years. Therefore, if Putin had left on time, he would forever remain in history as the greatest ruler who raised Russia from its knees. And today society evaluates the president from the point of view of the deterioration of its social position. The crisis in the country has lasted for the sixth year in a row and the incomes of the country's citizens have been declining for the sixth year in a row. People think about their pockets and how they will feed their children. This could have been tolerated for two years, when the president said in 2014 that you would be patient for two years, and then everything would be fine. And people, of course, tolerated it. But six years in a row is too much. Colossal irritation in society is caused by the fact that any country in the world will not maintain a government that cannot cope with the crisis.

“And what in Russia? The president, having been re-elected, appoints the same government headed by the same prime minister named Medvedev, who is openly despised in the country. This is no secret to anyone. What feelings should this evoke in our people,” says Valery Solovey.

And then take it and get it - here’s pension reform. This is already a mockery of the people and common sense. In Russia, men in many regions do not live to be sixty-five years old. What is it? The president's ratings are falling last years, despite a short-term increase in popularity due to the return of Crimea. The people have already had a lot of negative experience in recent years, and in the mass consciousness of people, the figure of Putin will be assessed more and more negatively.

“From the point of view of history, I say this as a historian, he will be assessed as a person who missed a unique historical chance to ensure the rapid development of Russia. Who exchanged the development of Russia, the growth of the well-being of the people for the growth of the well-being of his friends,” says Valery Solovey.

In the early 2000s, when energy prices were rising, the president missed the opportunity to reform the economy. His liberal circle told him: why, look at the oil prices and they will rise. Why should we develop our own industry? We will buy everything. We have enough money for everything, including theft. It was with this strange conviction that the president and his entourage lived. Russia will continue to sell raw materials for a long time and there is no escape from it. The question is how and where the proceeds from this are invested, and who manages them.

“We will spend it on the Rotenbergs building luxurious palaces and buying themselves the largest yachts in the world. These people, 15 years ago, walked around St. Petersburg in sports trousers and sold small consumer goods in kiosks,” says Valery Solovey.

But there are so many disadvantaged old people in our country, so many unhappy people. In the country, the whole world is collecting money for the treatment of children abroad, since the state does not have the funds for this. This is what you need to spend money on. If you say that people are our main value, let’s invest them in making life at least a little better and simpler.

“Rumors have spread throughout Moscow that the archives are being evacuated from the FSB building on Lubyanka by helicopters.”

Five years have passed since the beginning of mass protests that broke out in the capital in December 2011, after the announcement of the results of the State Duma elections. However, the question “what was that?” still does not have a clear answer. According to MGIMO professor, political scientist and historian Valery Solovy, we are talking about an “attempt at revolution” that had every chance of success.

Valery Solovey reflects on the origins and meaning of the “Snow Revolution” and the reasons for its defeat in an interview with MK.

Help "MK": “Valery Solovey recently published a book, the title of which will scare some, but may inspire others: “Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era." This work analyzes, first of all, the experience of “color” revolutions, to which the scientist includes the Russian events of five years ago. The chapter dedicated to them is called “The Revolution Betrayed.”

Valery Dmitrievich, judging by the abundance of reassuring forecasts issued on the eve of the 2011 Duma elections, the mass protests that followed turned out to be a complete surprise for many, if not most, politicians and experts. Tell me honestly: were they a surprise for you too?

No, for me they were not a surprise. Back in the early autumn of 2011, my interview was published under the title: “Soon the fate of the country will be decided on the streets and squares of the capital.”

But in fairness, I will say that I was not the only one who turned out to be such a visionary. Somewhere in the first half of September, I managed to talk with an employee of one of the Russian special services, who, as part of his duty, studies mass sentiment. I will not specify what kind of organization this is, but the quality of their sociology is considered very high. And I had the opportunity to see that this reputation was justified.

This person frankly told me then that since the early 2000s there had not been such an alarming situation for the authorities. I ask: “What, even mass unrest is possible?” He says: “Yes, they are possible.” When asked what he and his department are going to do in this situation, my interlocutor replied: “Well, what? We report to the authorities. But they don’t believe us. They think that with such horror stories we prove our need. The authorities are confident that the situation is under control and that nothing will happen."

In addition, in the spring of 2011, the Center for Strategic Research, then headed by Mikhail Dmitriev, published a report that spoke of the high likelihood of public discontent in connection with the elections, including mass protests. In a word, what happened was, in principle, predicted. However, between the categories “could happen” and “occurs” there is a huge distance. Even if we say that something will happen with a high probability, it is not at all a fact that it will happen. But in December 2011 it happened.

Vladimir Putin psychologically calculated the situation very accurately when he chose Dmitry Medvedev as his successor. No one else from Putin’s circle would have agreed to the “castling” that occurred after the expiration of the first presidential term, Valery Solovey is sure.

There is a version according to which the unrest was inspired by Medvedev and his inner circle. Is there any basis for such conspiracy theories?

Absolutely none. It is noteworthy that the core of the first protest action, which began on December 5, 2011 on Chistoprudny Boulevard, was made up of people who were election observers. They saw how it all happened and had no doubt that the announced results were falsified. Only a few hundred people were expected to attend this first rally, but several thousand showed up. Moreover, they were very determined: they moved to the center of Moscow, breaking through the cordons of the police and internal troops. I personally witnessed these clashes. It was clear that the behavior of the protesters turned out to be an unpleasant surprise for the police. She clearly did not expect such militant behavior from previously harmless hipsters.

It was an unalloyed moral protest. Spitting in a person’s face and demanding that he wipe himself off and perceive it as God’s dew - and this is exactly what the behavior of those in power looked like - one should not be surprised at his indignation. Society, offended at first by the “castling” of Putin and Medvedev, was then warped by the shameless manner in which the party in power tried to ensure its monopoly position in parliament. Millions of people felt deceived.

Another thing is that some people from Medvedev’s inner circle had the idea to use the rapidly expanding protest in the interests of their boss. And they came into contact with the protest leaders. According to some reports, Dmitry Anatolyevich was invited to speak on December 10, 2011 at a rally on Bolotnaya Square. And, so to speak, replay the situation with the “castling”. But Medvedev did not dare to do this. These rumors, however, were enough for a version of a conspiracy to emerge in the minds of the security officers, in which Medvedev participated on the one hand, and the West on the other.

I repeat, there are no grounds for such suspicions. However, the consequence of this version was that Putin doubted Medvedev's loyalty for a long time. The fact is that he, so to speak, is pure in his thoughts and does not harbor “treacherous” plans. As far as we know, suspicions were finally lifted only about a year and a half ago. But today, Putin, on the contrary, considers Medvedev a person who can be completely trusted. This manifested itself, in particular, in the situation with. The attack on the government was planned to be much larger. But, as we know, the president publicly confirmed his trust in the government and personally in Medvedev and thereby drew a “red line” for the security forces.

The calculations of the “conspirators” at that time were clean water projected or did they rely on Medvedev’s position?

I think that they acted on their own, hoping that the situation would “steer” in a favorable direction for their boss and, accordingly, for themselves. I am sure that Medvedev did not and could not give them such a sanction. This is not the same psychological type.

By the way, there are different points of view on how Medvedev reacted to his “non-reaffirmation” as president. Someone, for example, believes that he had absolutely no reason to be upset: he performed brilliantly in a play written at the time of his nomination for the presidency.

I don’t believe in such long-term and echeloned conspiracy theories. I have a feeling - and not only me - that Dmitry Anatolyevich was going to be re-elected after all. But he found himself in a situation where he had to abandon this idea. Psychologically, his stronger partner broke him.

- And he resignedly obeyed?

Well, not entirely resignedly, of course. It was probably a personal tragedy. Sergei Ivanov, of course, would not behave this way. And no one else from Putin’s circle. In this sense, Vladimir Vladimirovich psychologically calculated the situation very accurately, the choice was made correctly.

However, the future looked different in 2007 than it did in 2011. There were some important and still hidden from the public circumstances that did not allow us to say with confidence that castling would take place in 2011.

You call the mass protest movement in Russia an “attempt at revolution.” But today the prevailing point of view is that the circle of these revolutionaries was terribly narrow and they were terribly far from the people, and therefore did not pose a real threat to the authorities. They say that the rest of Russia remained indifferent to this Moscow intellectual “revolt of the Decembrists,” which therefore was nothing more than a storm in a teacup.

This is wrong. Just look at the results of sociological surveys conducted at the same time, in hot pursuit. Look: at the start of the protests, almost half of Muscovites, 46 percent, in one way or another approved of the opposition’s actions. 25 percent had a negative attitude towards them. Only a quarter. Moreover, even fewer are categorically against it - 13 percent.

Another 22 percent found it difficult to determine their attitude or declined to answer. This is data from the Levada Center. It is also significant that 2.5 percent of the capital’s residents announced their participation in the rally on Bolotnaya Square on December 10, 2011.

Judging by these data, the number of participants must have been at least 150 thousand. In reality, there were half as many of them - about 70 thousand. From this funny fact it follows that at the end of 2011, participation in protests was considered an honorable thing. A kind of symbolic privilege. And remember how many representatives of the Russian elite were at these winter rallies. And Prokhorov came, and Kudrin, and Ksenia Sobchak was jostling on the podium...

“But outside Moscow the mood was different.

Until now, all revolutions in Russia have developed according to the so-called central type: you seize power in the capital, and after that the whole country is in your hands. Therefore, what they thought at that moment in the provinces does not matter at all. This matters for elections, but not for revolutions. This is the first thing.

Secondly, the mood in the provinces was not so different then from the capital. According to the fund's survey " Public opinion", held nationwide in mid-December 2011, the demand to cancel the results of the State Duma elections and hold a repeat vote was shared by 26 percent of Russians. That's a lot. Less than half - 40 percent - did not support this requirement. And only 6 percent believed that the elections were held without fraud.

Obviously, the population of large cities fluctuated. It could well side with the Moscow hipster revolutionaries if they behaved more decisively.

In short, this cannot be called a “storm in a teacup.” In fact, on December 5, 2011, a revolution began in Russia. The protest covered an ever larger territory of the capital, and every day an increasing number of people were involved in it. Society expressed increasingly visible sympathy for the protesters. The police were exhausted, the authorities were confused and scared: even the phantasmagoric scenario of storming the Kremlin could not be ruled out.

Rumors spread across Moscow that the archives were being evacuated by helicopter from the FSB building on Lubyanka. It is not known how true they were, but the very fact of such rumors says a lot about the then mass mood in the capital. For at least two weeks in December the situation was extremely favorable for the opposition. All conditions were in place for a successful revolutionary action.

It is noteworthy that the protest developed rapidly, despite the fact that the government-controlled media, especially television, adhered to a policy of a strict information embargo against opposition actions. The thing is that the opposition has a “secret weapon” - social networks. It was through them that she campaigned, alerted and mobilized her supporters. I can’t help but notice, by the way, that since then the meaning social networks has grown even more.

As Donald Trump's recent campaign showed, they can already be used to win elections. I am now analyzing this experience of using social networks in classes with my students and in public master classes.

- Where and when was the move made in this game that predetermined the opposition’s loss?

I think if the December 10 rally, as previously planned, had been held on Revolution Square, events would have developed completely differently.

That is, Eduard Limonov is right when he claims that the protest began to be “leaked” at the moment when the leaders agreed to change the location of the protest?

Absolutely. At least twice as many people would come to Revolution Square more people, than came to Bolotnaya. And if you are familiar with the topography of Moscow, then you can easily imagine what it’s like to have 150 thousand people protesting in the very heart of the capital, a stone’s throw from the parliament and the Central Election Commission. Mass dynamics are unpredictable. One or two calls from the rostrum of the rally, spontaneous movement among its participants, awkward actions of the police - and a gigantic crowd moves towards the State Duma, the Central Election Commission, the Kremlin... The authorities understood this very well, so they did everything to move the rally to Bolotnaya. And opposition leaders came to the aid of the authorities. Moreover, they actually saved this government. The agreement to change Revolution Square to Bolotnaya meant, in essence, a refusal to fight. And in political, and in moral-psychological, and in symbolic terms.

- What was the name of the yacht, and how did it sail?

Absolutely right. Nevertheless, the opposition retained the opportunity to turn the tide of events in both January and February - right up to the presidential elections. If instead of the fruitless chants of “We are the power here”, “We will come again”, some action had been taken, the situation could well have turned around.

- What do you mean by actions?

All successful revolutions began with the creation of the so-called liberated territory. In the form, for example, of a street, square, block.

- A la Maidan?

Maidan is one of the historical modifications of this technology. In all revolutions, it is critical for revolutionaries to create a bridgehead, a foothold. If we take, for example, the Chinese revolution, which developed according to a peripheral type, then a bridgehead was created in the remote provinces of the country. And for the Bolsheviks during the October Revolution, such territory was Smolny. Sometimes they hold on to the bridgehead for quite a long time, sometimes events unfold very quickly. But it all starts with this. You can even gather half a million people, but it won't make any difference if people just stand there and leave.

It is important that quantitative dynamics be complemented by political, new and offensive forms of struggle. If you say: “No, we are standing here and will continue to stand until our demands are met,” then you are taking a significant step forward. Attempts to follow this path were made on March 5, 2012 on Pushkinskaya Square and on May 6 on Bolotnaya. But then it was too late - the window of opportunity had closed. The March and post-March situation was fundamentally different from the December one. If society had serious and justified doubts about the legitimacy of the parliamentary elections, then Putin’s victory in the presidential elections looked more than convincing. Even the opposition did not dare to challenge it.

But December, I emphasize, was an exceptionally convenient moment for the opposition. The massive rise of the protest movement was combined with the confusion of the authorities, who were quite ready to make serious concessions. However, by mid-January the mood of the power group had changed dramatically. The Kremlin and the White House have come to the conclusion that, despite the great mobilization potential of the protest, its leaders are not dangerous. That they are cowardly, do not want and even fear power, and that they are easy to manipulate. And one can only agree with this. Suffice it to recall the fact that New Year Almost all opposition leaders went on vacation abroad.

One of those people who formulated the political strategy of the government at that time told me the following after the fact: “On December 9-10, we saw that the opposition leaders were fools. And in early January we became convinced that they valued their own comfort above power. And then we decided: We won’t share power, but we will crush the opposition.” I quote almost verbatim.

- How far were the authorities ready to go in their concessions? What could the opposition even count on?

Concessions to power would be directly proportional to the pressure on it. True, I don’t really believe that the opposition could have won a complete victory then - come to power. But it was quite possible to achieve a political compromise.

It is known, for example, that the possibility of holding early parliamentary elections after the presidential elections was discussed in the corridors of power. But after the opposition leaders demonstrated a complete lack of strategy and will, this idea was removed from the agenda. However, I am not going to accuse anyone of anything. If God did not give volitional qualities, then he did not. As the French say, they have a frivolous saying: even the most beautiful girl cannot give more than what she has.

The art of a politician is to discern a historical opportunity, and not to push away from it with hands and feet. History very rarely provides an opportunity to change something, and it is usually unmerciful towards those politicians who miss their chance. It did not spare the leaders of the “Snow Revolution,” as these events are sometimes called. Navalny was subjected to criminal prosecution, his brother ended up in prison. Vladimir Ryzhkov lost his party, Gennady Gudkov lost his deputy mandate. Boris Nemtsov left us altogether... All these people thought that fate would give them another, better opportunity. But in revolution, the best is the enemy of the good. There may never be another chance.

It seems to me that the psychological picture of the “Snow Revolution” was largely predetermined by the phenomenon of August 1991. For some it was a miracle of victory, for others it was a terrible trauma of defeat. The security officers, who saw how the monument to Dzerzhinsky was destroyed, who were sitting in their offices at that time and were afraid that a crowd would break in, have since lived with fear: “Never again, we will never allow this to happen again.” And liberals - with the feeling that one fine day power itself will fall into their hands. Like then, in 1991: they didn’t touch a finger, but ended up on a horse.

Let's imagine that the opposition managed to achieve repeat parliamentary elections. How would this affect the development of the situation in the country?

I think that even with the most honest vote count, the liberals would not have been able to gain control of the State Duma. We would be content with a total of 15, or at most 20 percent of the seats. However, the political system would become much more open, flexible, and competitive. And as a result, very much of what happened in subsequent years would not have happened.

We would now live in a completely different country. This is the logic of the system: if it closes down, is deprived of internal dynamism, competition, if there is no one who could challenge the authorities, then the authorities can make any decisions they want. Including strategically erroneous ones. I can say that in March 2014, most of the elite were horrified by the decisions made then. In genuine fear.

“However, the majority of the country’s population perceives the events of March 2014 as a great blessing.

In my opinion, the attitude of the majority of the country’s population towards this was best and most accurately described by the talented playwright Evgeniy Grishkovets: the annexation of Crimea was illegal, but fair. It is clear that no one will be able to return Crimea to Ukraine. This would not have worked even for the Kasparov government if it had somehow miraculously come to power. But for society, Crimea is already an old topic; it is not present in everyday discourse today.

If in 2014-2015 the problem of Crimea divided the opposition and became an insurmountable wall, now it is simply put out of the picture. By the way, I would not be at all surprised by the restoration of the protest coalition that arose in 2011 and included both liberals and nationalists. As far as I know, this recovery is already happening.

How likely is it that in the foreseeable future we will see something similar to what the country experienced in that revolutionary winter?

I think the probability is quite high. Although probability, as I said, does not mean inevitability. After the suppression of the 2011-2012 revolution, the system stabilized. The internal “capitulators,” as the Chinese would call them, realized that they had to sniffle into a rag and follow in the wake of the leader, the national leader.

At the end of 2013, when a system of repressive measures began to take shape in the country, there was a feeling that the regime had cemented everything, that nothing would break through this concrete. But, as usually happens in history, everywhere and always the authorities themselves provoke new dynamics that undermine stability. First - Crimea, then - Donbass, then - Syria...

It wasn’t the Americans who planted this, it wasn’t the opposition. When initiating geopolitical dynamics of this magnitude, you must be aware that they will inevitably affect the socio-political system. And we see that this system is becoming more and more unstable. Which is manifested, in particular, in the growing nervousness within the Russian elite, in mutual attacks, in the war of compromising evidence, in the growth of social tension.

The turbulence of the system is increasing. By the way, the revolution that took place in our country at the turn of the 1980-1990s, from the point of view of the criteria of historical sociology, did not end. You and I are still living in a revolutionary era, and new revolutionary paroxysms are not at all ruled out.

The state machine has begun to work worse, street protest will increase, and the Internet will be turned off for us in 2019 - political scientist Valery Solovey told MBKh Media what the results of the Unified Voting Day in Russia indicate and what to expect in the near future.

On the failure of United Russia

— It was predictable that United Russia would perform worse than usual in these elections. However, no one imagined that it would be so bad. Neither experts, nor members of the presidential administration, nor the candidates themselves expected this. Moreover, according to my information, during the counting of votes in many regions, the voting results were adjusted. And even despite this, United Russia candidates received significantly fewer votes than in previous years. Of course, the “party in power” was defeated in yesterday’s elections.

What happened is primarily due to the fact that changes in public sentiment began to turn into changes in political behavior. People who are dissatisfied, for example, with the pension reform, began to vote against those who are introducing this reform - the current authorities. Previously, dissatisfaction with specific phenomena or processes did not develop into dissatisfaction with those who are behind it.

On the prospects of electoral protest

“Very soon those who voted against United Russia may take to street protests to express their dissatisfaction. So far they have not done this because the social reasons are not clear enough. However, it is already clear that street protest in the regions has a core, even though it is often spontaneous in nature. In my opinion, the electoral protest could develop into a street protest within a year. It needs time to mature. Life is getting worse, pressure on citizens is increasing, and very soon Russians will think about taking part in rallies. Yesterday, many of them voted for the first time not for United Russia, and in a year they may go to the square demanding the resignation of the authorities. For example, the disconnection of the Russian Internet from the world Internet, which, according to my information, is planned by the authorities for the end of 2019, can provoke mass participation in rallies.

About the conclusions that the authorities will draw

“The main thing that the elections demonstrated is that the state machine is working worse and worse, its effectiveness is decreasing. Will the election results change anything? I think not. It is unlikely that the authorities will listen to changes in public assessments of their actions. In general, elections in Russia have long been a formality that does not seriously affect anything. I also don’t think that there will be any serious changes in the Kremlin due to the disastrous outcome of the elections. However, it is clear that the protest potential is growing and will continue to grow, which means people will use other means to inform the authorities of their dissatisfaction.